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Note
The Public Use Bar to Patentability: Two New
Approaches to the Experimental Use Exception
I. INTRODUCTION
Three broad requirements must be satisfied in order to ob-
tain a patent. The inventor must show that his invention is
novel,' useful,2 and a nonobvious development over the prior
art.3  The subsections of section 102 of title 35 of the United
States Code are designed to ensure that the requirement of nov-
elty is satisfied. This Note examines the "public use" provision
of section 102, which provides that an inventor shall not be enti-
tled to a patent if "the invention was. . . in public use or on sale
in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the
application for patent in the United States .... ,4 The term
"public use" has been broadly construed; it is clear that the
statute applies both to public and hidden 5 uses, whether made
by the inventor himself or by others.6 A finding of public use
negates the invention's novelty and will therefore either preclude
the issuance of a patent or invalidate a previously issued one.
The major limitation to the public use statute is the judi-
cially created experimental use exception, which allows an in-
ventor to avoid the effect of the statute by showing that his use
of the invention was experimental. The experimental use ex-
ception is thought to benefit both the inventor and the public
for "it is the interest of the public, as well as himself [the in-
ventor], that the invention should be perfect and properly
tested, before a patent is granted for it."
'7
1. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1964).
2. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1964).
3. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1964).
4. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1964). This section should be compared
with § 102(a) which provides, in part, that a patent may not be granted
if "the invention was known or used by others in this country . . . be-
fore the invention thereof by the applicant for patent." Section 102 (a)
is designed to ensure that only the original inventor may obtain a patent,
while § 102 (b) precludes a patent from issuing on an invention which
has been in the public domain for a year prior to the filing of the ap-
plication for that patent.
5. See, e.g., Hall v. MacNeale, 107 U.S. 90 (1882); Egbert v. Lipp-
mann, 104 U.S. 333 (1881); Note, Public Use: The Inventor's Dilemma,
26 GEO. WAsH. L. REV. 297, 305-07 (1958).
6. See, e.g., Magee v. Coca-Cola Co., 232 F.2d 596 (7th Cir. 1956).
7. Elizabeth v. Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 137 (1877).
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Cases often arise under section 102(b) because inventors
frequently use their inventions in public more than one year
before they apply for a patent. In these cases, the courts are
usually required to rule on the defense that the use came within
the experimental use exception. Unfortunately, holdings on
this issue have been marked with confusion and inconsistency.8
It is the purpose of this Note to examine the problems under-
lying the difficulty faced by the courts in applying the exception,
and to propose two means of alleviating these problems.
II. THE EXPERIMENTAL USE EXCEPTION IN GENERAL
Courts ruling on the applicability of the experimental use
exception have used one of two approaches: Was the invention
in its experimental stage at the time of its use,9 or, more simply,
was the use itself experimental in nature? 10 These two ap-
proaches are neither well defined nor mutually exclusive." Un-
der the first approach, the experimental use exception is applica-
ble to all uses made of an invention in its experimental stage,
even if the purpose of the use was not experimental.' 2 The
problem with this approach is that it requires a court to deter-
mine the point at which an invention passes its experimental
stage. The courts' difficulty in making this determination 3 is not
8. Compare Watson v. Allen, 254 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 1958), with
In re Blaisdell, 242 F.2d 779 (C.C.P.A. 1957).
9. See, e.g., Cataphote Corp. v. DeSoto Chem. Coatings, Inc., 356
F.2d 24, 27 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 832 (1966); Atlas v. Eastern
Air Lines, Inc., 311 F.2d 156, 162 (1st Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S.
904 (1963); Redman v. Stedman Mfg. Co., 154 F. Supp. 378, 383
(M.D.N.C. 1957), aff'd, 257 F.2d 867 (4th Cir. 1958); cf. B.F. Sturtevant
Co. v. Massachusetts Hair & Felt Co., 124 F.2d 95, 97 (1st Cir. 1941),
cert. denied, 315 U.S. 823 (1942).
10. See, e.g., Ushakoff v. United States, 327 F.2d 669 (Ct. Cl. 1964);
In re Blaisdell, 242 F.2d 779 (C.C.P.A. 1957); cf. Aerovox Corp. v. Poly-
met Mfg. Corp., 67 F.2d 860 (2d Cir. 193,S).
11. See, e.g., Watson v. Allen, 254 F.2d 342, 346 (D.C. Cir. 1958);
Adams v. Columbus Mfg. Co., 180 F. Supp. 921 (M.D. Ga. 1960).
12. See Sperry Rand Corp. v. Bell Tel. Laboratories, Inc., 208 F.
Supp. 598 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); cf. Browning Mfg. Co. v. Brothers, Inc., 134
U.S.P.Q. 231 (D. Minn. 1962), affd, 317 F.2d 413 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 825 (1963).
In Sperry Rand, the uses in question were public demonstrations.
The court refused to find a public use, apparently on the grounds that
the invention had not passed its experimental stage at the time of its
demonstration. For a discussion of the Sperry Rand and Browning
cases, see note 87 infra and accompanying text. For a discussion of
public demonstrations generally, see notes 57-59 infra and accompanying
text.
13. Several definitions of the point at which the invention passes
its experimental stage have been proposed. It has occasionally been
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surprising in light of the frequently recognized ineptness with
which judges without technical background resolve abstract pa-
tent questions.14 A judge who does not thoroughly understand
the invention in the first place is obviously in a poor position to
determine whether the invention had passed its experimental
stage at the time of its use.
Other courts have been less concerned with the question of
whether the invention was in its experimental stage at the
time of the use, but rather have sought to determine whether
the inventor's use of the invention was experimental. This
seems to be a more desirable approach, since it avoids the diffi-
cult determination of whether the invention was in its experi-
mental stage at the time of its use. Moreover, this approach
would permit the utilization of judicially cognizable subtests to
further simplify the determination of experimental use questions.
III. THE SUBTESTS APPROACH
A. DEFINING THE SUBTESTS OF EXPERnIMENATION
Recognizing that judges are often ill-trained to pass on ab-
stract patent questions, courts and commentators have developed
certain judicially cognizable subtests to aid in the determination
of the difficult and abstract question of whether the invention
satisfies the section 103 requirement of nonobviousness. 15 A
stated that an invention passes this stage when it is "reduced to prac-
tice." Nicholson v. Carl W. Mullis Eng'r & Mfg. Co., 315 F.2d 532, 535
(4th Cir. 1963); Kayton, This Year (1966) in Patent Law, 35 GEo. WASH.
L. REV. 720, 727-28 (1967). However, this restrictive position has not
been generally accepted, and several courts have expressly stated that
experimentation may continue beyond a reduction to practice. E.g.,
Atlas v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 311 F.2d 156, 162 (1st Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 373 U.S. 904 (1963); General Motors Corp. v. Bendix Aviation
Corp., 123 F. Supp. 506, 520 (N.D. Ind. 1954); see generally Pigott, The
Concepts of Public Use and Sale, 49 J. PAT. Orr. Soc'y 399, 413, 415
(1967). The leading experimental use case indicates that experimenta-
tion may continue until the invention is "perfect." Elizabeth v. Pave-
ment Co., 97 U.S. 126, 137 (1877). However, it is doubtful whether this
verbalization should be taken literally since, as the Court recognized in
a later case, an invention may never reach perfection. Smith & Griggs
Mfg. Co. v. Sprague, 123 U.S. 249, 265 (1887).
14. See Marconi Wireless Tel. Co. v. United States, 320 U.S. 1, 60-61
(1943) (dissenting opinion); Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co.,
189 F. 95, 115 (S.D.N.Y. 1911). See generally Borkin, The Patent In-
fringement Suit-Ordeal by Trial, 17 U. Cat. L. REv. 634, 641 (1950);
Medina, A New Judge Tries His First Patent Case, 34 CoRNE= L.Q. 220
(1948); Note, Subtests of "Nonobviousness": A Nontechnical Approach
to Patent Validity, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 1169, 1170 (1964).
15. These subtests include, for example, commercial success of the
invention, long felt but unsatisfied demand, and professional approval.
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somewhat analogous development has taken place in the ex-
perimental use area where courts have from time-to-time con-
sidered certain of the inventor's activities during his alleged
experimentation as being significant or even determinative in the
disposition of experimental use cases. However, these activities
have not been formally recognized as subtests 6 and it is sel-
dom, if ever, that they are all discussed in a single case. It is
proposed that the activities discussed below, as well as any others
determined to be relevant, be formalized into a set of subtests
to aid the courts in the more accurate resolution of experimental
use questions.
1. Inspection
The purpose of experimentation is to ascertain how the in-
vention will behave under a given set of conditions. Experi-
mentation without inspection of the behavior of the invention
would obviously be pointless. Thus, it is suggested that the
failure of the inventor or his agent to inspect may be viewed
as determinative of a public use. Although there is a paucity of
authority on this point, one case does seem to treat the inven-
tor's lack of inspection as determinative.17 Moreover, the ab-
sence of inspection was considered significant in several cases in
which a public use was found, although it is not clear that the
lack of inspection was determinative in these cases since other
factors indicating a public use were also noted.' 8 In any event,
no case has been found in which the experimental use exception
was applied in the absence of inspection.
Although the lack of inspection may rightly be considered
determinative, the converse is not necessarily true. If other fac-
tors indicate that the invention was beyond its experimental
stage at the time of the use, the mere fact that the inventor did
inspect will not be sufficient to make out an experimental use.19
Also, the inventor's "inspection" may only be that which is
See generally Note, Subtests of "Nonobviousness": A Nontechnical Ap-
proach to Patent Validity, supra note 14, at 1170.
16. Cf. Note, Prior Art in the Patent Law, 73 HAIv. L. REv. 369, 383
(1959), where several of the proposed subtests are recognized as relevant
factors.
17. See Metallizing Eng'r Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co.,
62 F. Supp. 42, 55-56 (D. Conn. 1945), rev'd on other grounds, 153 F.2d
516 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 840 (1.946).
18. See, e.g., Egbert v. Lippman, 104 U.S. 333 (1881); Kennedy v.
Ford Motor Co., 45 U.S.P.Q. 126 (S.D. Ohio 1940).




normal for any hopeful seller in looking after his product,2 0 and
thus may not be entitled to the weight usually attributed to a
bona fide inspection.2 1
Thus, under the proposed analysis, the absence of inspec-
tion would be determinative of a public use while its presence
could be indicative of an experimental use. Since the presence
or absence of inspection is a fact that is readily ascertainable, it
has potential as a valuable subtest of experimentation.
2. Control
The inventor must retain control over his invention in order
to carry on experimentation. The absence of control should
therefore be determinative of a public use and the few cases
which have considered this problem have generally so held. 22
However, the presence of control would not be determinative of
an experimental use since the inventor could, of course, retain
control over his invention and still place it in public use. Thus,
control, like inspection, is most significant in its absence.
A special problem arises when the inventor lacks sufficient
testing equipment himself and must therefore transfer his in-
vention to others in order to have it tested. Clearly the transfer
of the legal ownership of the invention does not in itself pre-
clude the application of the experimental use exception.2 3 In
20. See Cataphote Corp. v. DeSoto Chem. Coatings Inc., 235 F.
Supp. 936, 939-40 (N.D. Cal. 1964), affd, 356 F.2d 24 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 832 (1966).
21. See, e.g., Elizabeth v. Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 133 (1877).
22. See, e.g., In re Blaisdell, 242 F.2d 779, 784 (C.C.P.A. 1957),
where the court, in finding a public use, stated: "Not only did he not
exercise control over the shims but, as well, he lost complete contact
with them and was no longer concerned with experimental considera-
tions as to those particular articles." But see Watson v. Allen, 254 F.2d
342 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (contrary decision on an identical use).
23. See, e.g., Elizabeth v. Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126 (1877), where
the Supreme Court stated that "[tihe use of an invention by the inven-
tor himself, or of any other person under his direction, by way of exper-
inment ... has never been regarded as such a [public] use." Id. at 134.
Adams v. Columbus Mfg. Co., 180 F. Supp. 921, 925-26 (MD. Ga. 1960).
The inventor's purpose in making the transfer must have been to
have his invention tested. If a transfer is made for nonexperimental
purposes, a public use will be found. Egbert v. Lippman, 104 U.S. 333
(1881). The fact that the transferee happened to use the invention ex-
perimentally will not change the result. See Tool Research & Eng'r
Corp. v. Honcor Corp., 367 F.2d 449, 453 (9th Cir. 1966); Cataphote Corp.
v. DeSoto Chem. Coatings, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 936, 939 (N.D. Cal. 1964),
aff'd, 356 F.2d 24 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 832 (1966). If the
inventor gives his invention to another for nonexperimental purposes,
a public use can be avoided only if the inventor restricts the donee to
19681
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such a case, the inventor should not be penalized for his lack
of testing facilities; the requirement of control ought to be
satisfied if the inventor maintains sufficient contact with the
testers to show his continuing interest in the experimentation.
This interest could be shown, for example, by proof that the
testers communicated the results of the experimentation back
to the inventor.
24
3. Status of Developmental Work
The fact that the inventor is developing, improving, or other-
wise changing his invention may indicate that his use was ex-
perimental.25  On the other hand, absence of developmental
work may indicate that the experimental period has ended . 2
Since critical dates regarding the development of an invention
may be gleaned from invention records27 or shown by actual
changes made in the invention,28 the status of developmental
work provides a useful and provable subtest.
It is doubtful, however, that a developmental work subtest
should be considered determinative of either a public or experi-
mental use.29 The fact that the inventor did not develop his
secret use at the time of the transfer. Piet v. United States, 176 F. Supp.
576, 582 (S.D. Cal. 1959). If the transferee makes a public use of the
invention, this public use will terminate the inventor's right to a patent,
Knoedler Mfg. Inc. v. Western Land Roller Co., 319 F.2d 599 (7th Cir.
1963), even if the public use was a breach of the transferee's obligation
of secrecy. Lorenz v. Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co., 167 F.2d 423 (3d Cir.
1948), noted in 17 GEO. WASH. L. Rav. 418 (1949).
24. Since in many cases the testing will be done gratuitously, it
would be difficult or even impossible for the inventor to require the
tester to report the test results, or even to restrict the tester to secrecy,
in light of the potential liability for breach of an obligation of secrecy.
See Boscarino v. Neo-Line Prods. Corp., 167 N.Y.S.2d 580 (Sup. Ct.
1957), noted in 3 VmL. L. REV. 391 (1958).
25. See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator
Co., 118 F.2d 278, 279 (2d Cir. 1941); Adams v. Columbus Mfg. Co., 180
F. Supp. 921, 926 (M.D. Ga. 1960); Pigott, supra note 13, at 413-15.
26. See, e.g., Egbert v. Lippman, 104 U.S. 333 (1881); Cataphote
Corp. v. DeSoto Chem. Coatings, Inc., 2B5 F. Supp. 936, 937-38 (N.D.
Cal. 1964), affd, 356 F.2d 24 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 832 (1966).
27. See, e.g., McCullough Tool Co. v. Well Surveys, Inc., 343 F.2d
381, 394 (10th Cr. 1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 990 (1966); Cataphote
Corp. v. DeSoto Chem. Coatings, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 936, 937 (N.D. Cal.
1964), affd, 356 F.2d 24 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 832 (1966). For
a discussion of invention records, see Jackson, Records of Research, 35
J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 239 (1953).
28. See, e.g., Warner & Swasey Co. v. Universal Marion Corp., 237
F. Supp. 719, 723-25 (D. Colo. 1964), aff'd, 354 F.2d 541 (10th Cir. 1965).
29. Compare Elizabeth v. Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126 (1877) (an
experimental use was found even in the absence of developmental
[Vol. 52:851
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invention during the use does not necessarily mean that the
use was not experimental, since it may have been undertaken to
determine if any further developmental work was necessary.
Similarly, a lack of developmental work after the use does not
necessarily imply that the use was not experimental, since the
use may have shown that no further development was needed.30
Conversely, the mere fact that the inventor was still developing
his invention during or after the use will not be sufficient to
invoke the experimental exception, 31 since if it were otherwise
an inventor could stall for an undue period by continuing to
make minor changes and improvements in his invention.3 2
Thus, under the proposed analysis, the status of develop-
mental work would not be determinative. Of course, some sig-
nificance may be attached to the presence or absence of develop-
mental work, especially in conjunction with other subtests. For
example, an inventor's allegation that he inspected would be re-
inforced if he could show that further developmental work on
the invention had resulted from the alleged inspection. On the
other hand, developmental work after the use would obviously
be of little significance if that work were not based on an inspec-
tion of the use.33
4. Commercial Exploitation
Although it is clear that a commercial use of the invention
is permissible if it is incidental to experimentation, 4 it is also
clear that when an inventor's commercial use of his invention
work), with Lanham v. Southern Bakeries Co., 198 F. Supp. 926, 928-29
(N.D. Ga. 1960), affd per curiam, 295 F.2d 816 (5th Cir. 1961) (a public
use was found even though developmental work was continued during
the use, and changes in the invention were actually made).
30. See Elizabeth v. Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 135 (1877).
31. See Smith & Griggs Mfg. Co. v. Sprague, 123 U.S. 249, 265
(1887); Merry Hull & Co. v. Hi-Line Co., 243 F. Supp. 45 (S.D.N.Y.
1965); Warner & Swasey Co. v. Universal Marion Corp., 237 F. Supp. 719(D. Colo. 1964), affd, 354 F.2d 541 (10th Cir. 1965); Lanham v. Southern
Bakeries Co., 198 F. Supp. 962 (N.D. Ga. 1960), aff'd per curiam, 295
F.2d 816 (5th Cir. 1961); E.L. Mansure Co. v. Consolidated Trimming
Corp., 16 F. Supp. 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1936). See also Note, Inventor's Ex-
perimental Use of His Patentable Invention, 1 ST. Louis U.L.J. 241, 257-
58 (1951).
32. Cf. Lanham v. Southern Bakeries Co., 198 F. Supp. 926, 936
(N.D. Ga. 1960).
33. Cf. Smith & Davis Mfg. Co. v. Mellon, 58 F. 705 (8th Cir. 1893).
34. See, e.g., Adams v. Columbus Mfg. Co., 180 F. Supp. 921 (M.D.
Ga. 1960), aff'd per curiam, 295 F.2d 816 (5th Cir. 1961); Metallizing
Eng'r Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Co., 62 F. Supp. 42, 55 (D. Conn.




rises to a level which has been termed commercial exploitation,
the statute will terminate his right to a patent.3 5  This position
is justified for two reasons: (1) since it is doubtful that an in-
ventor would attempt to commercially exploit an invention still
in its experimental stage, the presence of commercial exploitation
will usually mean that the invention has passed its experi-
mental stage; 36 (2) commercial exploitation conflicts with the
policy of section 102 (b).37 For the same reasons, commercial ex-
ploitation provides the basis for the most accurate subtest. As a
subtest, the presence of commercial exploitation is clearly deter-
minative of a public use; its absence, however, although signifi-
cant, has usually not been deemed sufficient in itself to invoke
the experimental exception. 8
The commercial exploitation subtest is more difficult to ap-
ply than the others since commercial exploitation may occur in
many different forms. Sales of the invention are perhaps the
most common form. However, even in the absence of sales, it is
clear that commercial exploitation may be found in the inven-
tor's attempt to develop or promote a market for his invention.39
Thus, consumer tests, market tests, and public demonstrations
are also potential forms of commercial exploitation. Since the
line between an incidental commercial use and commercial ex-
ploitation is not easily drawn, it will be helpful to briefly analyze
each of these potential forms of commercial exploitation.
(a) Sales
In general, the "on sale" provision of section 102 (b) provides
that the patent right will terminate il an invention is either sold
or offered for sale more than one year before the application
for patent.40 However, since it is clear that the experimental
35. See, e.g., Aerovox Corp. v. Polymet Mfg. Corp., 67 F.2d 860, 862
(2d Cir. 1933).
36. See In re Bertram, 88 F.2d 834, 837 (C.C.P.A. 1937). There
may be a few exceptions to this generaL proposition. See authorities
cited note 87 infra.
37. See note 69 infra and accompanying text.
38. See, e.g., Egbert v. Lippman, 104 U.S. 333 (1881); In re
Blaisdell, 242 F.2d 779, 785 (C.C.P.A. 1957).
39. See, e.g., Cataphote Corp. v. DeSoto Chem. Coatings, Inc., 356
F.2d 24, 27 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 832 (1966); Atlas v. Eastern
Air Lines, Inc., 311 F.2d 156, 162 (lst Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S.
904 (1963); Armour & Co. v. Rath Packing Co., 154 F. Supp. 54, 56-57
(N.D. Ill. 1957).
40. E.g., Midland Flour Milling Co. v. Bobbitt, 70 F.2d 416 (8th Cir.
1934); Chicopee Mfg. Corp. v. Columbus Fiber Mills Co., 165 F. Supp.
307 (M.D. Ga. 1958). Courts have generally been reluctant to hold that
[Vol. 52:851
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use exception also applies to the "on sale" provision,41 a sale or
offer for sale incidental to an experimental use is permissible.42
Although the "public use" and "on sale" provisions of sec-
tion 102(b) are conceptually distinct,43 courts have often failed
to recognize this distinction. 44 This may be due either to the
fact that the finding of a sale, although not necessarily an offer
for sale, will usually a fortiori determine a public use, or to the
fact that the "on sale" provision has, to some degree, become en-
tangled in "the witty diversities"45 of the law of sales and it may
therefore be simpler for a court to proceed under the "public use"
provision. In any case, sales or offers for sale may provide a
helpful subtest of public use to the extent that they imply
commercial exploitation. Thus, the court in Cataphote Corpora-
tion v. DeSoto Chemical Coatings, Inc.46 was correct in noting
that outright sale of the invention in a foreign country implied
commercial exploitation and, therefore, a public use, even though
foreign sales are not within the scope of section 102 (b).47
The context in which the sale or offer for sale was made
must be considered in determining whether it implies commer-
cial exploitation. The difference between an isolated sale of the
invention to an individual and sales to the general public made
an invention is "on sale" within the statute. See, e.g., B.F. Sturtevant
Co. v. Massachusetts Hair & Felt Co., 124 F.2d 95 (1st Cir. 1941), cert.
denied, 315 U.S. 823 (1942); Browning Mvlfg. Co. v. Brothers, Inc., 134
U.S.P.Q. 231 (D. Minn. 1962), affd, 317 F.2d 413 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 825 (1963); Redman v. Stedman Mfg. Co., 154 F. Supp. 378
(M.D.N.C. 1957), aff'd, 257 F.2d 867 (4th Cir. 1958). See generally
Choate, "On Sale"--Review and Circumspection, 47 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y
906 (1965).
41. E.g., Servo Corp. of America v. General Elec. Co., 220 F. Supp.
473, 482 (W.D. Va. 1963); Browning Mfg. Co. v. Brothers, Inc., 134
U.S.P.Q. 231, 235 (D. Minn. 1962), alfd, 317 F.2d 413 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 825 (1963); Adams v. Columbus Mfg. Co., 180 F. Supp.
921, 925-26 (M.D. Ga. 1960).
42. Thus, for example, the inventor may sell the product of an ex-
perimental machine or process. American Caramel Co. v. Thomas Mills
& Bros., 149 F. 743 (3d Cir. 1906); Bryce Bros. Co. v. Seneca Glass Co.,.
140 F. 161 (N.D.W. Va. 1905).
43. Piet v. United States, 176 F. Supp. 576, 583-84 (S.D. Cal. 1959).
44. See, e.g., Adams v. Columbus Mfg. Co., 180 F. Supp. 921, 925-26
(M.D. Ga. 1960); Ushakoff v. United States, 327 F.2d 669, 671-72 (Ct. Cl.
1964).
45. McCreery Eng'r Co. v. Massachusetts Fan Co., 195 F. 498, 501(1st Cir. 1912); National Cash Register Co. v. American Cash Register
Co., 178 F. 79, 83 (2d Cir. 1910).
46. 235 F. Supp. 936 (N.D. Cal. 1964), aff'd, 356 F.2d 24 (9th Cir.
1966).
47. 235 F. Supp. at 940.
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in the inventor's regular course of business may be germane.48
Advertising is also difficult to reconcile with an experimental
use and therefore implies commercial exploitation. 49 Finally,
profit on the sale may also be evidence of commercial exploi-
tation,50 although a profit incidental to an experimental sale
is generally said to be permissible.5 1
(b) Consumer Tests
The consumer test is another potential form of commercial
exploitation. Such tests are usually used to determine the in-
dividual consumer's reactions to the invention by a systematic
testing of a representative portion of the community. The in-
vention is usually given, rather than sold, to the individuals to
be tested. The inventor may have undertaken the test in order
to develop or promote a market for his invention by exposing
it to the public, in which case a finding of commercial exploita-
tion is clearly justified. However, the purpose of the test may
have been only to determine whether the invention possesses suf-
ficient potential commercial value to justify patenting, which
may be an experimental use.52 If both motives are present, a
court will have to determine whether the use was "substan-
tially"'53 for the permissible purpose.
(c) Market Tests
A market test must be distinguished from a consumer test.
The differences between the two are both quantitative and
qualitative. In a typical market test, the inventor will go into
limited production and openly sell the invention through normal
48. Compare Watson v. Allen, 254 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 1958), with
Cataphote Corp. v. DeSoto Chem. Coatings, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 936 (N.D.
Cal. 1964), affd, 356 F.2d 24 (9th Cir.), ce'rt denied, 385 U.S. 832 (1966).
See also Smith & Griggs Mfg. Co. v. Sprague, 123 U.S. 249, 254 (1887).
49. Cf. Smith & Davis Mfg. Co. v. Mellon, 58 F. 705, 706 (8th Cir.
1893).
50. See, e.g., Sperry Rand Corp. v. Bell Tel. Laboratories, Inc., 208
F. Supp. 598, 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
51. E.g., Smith & Griggs Mfg. Co. v. Sprague, 123 U.S. 249, 256
(1887); Ushakoff v. United States, 327 F.2d 669, 672 (Ct. Cl. 1964).
52. See Johnson & Johnson v. Kendall Co., 215 F. Supp. 124 (N.D.
Ill. 1963), rev'd on other grounds, 327 F.2d 391 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 934 (1964); International Silver Co. v. Julie Pomerantz, Inc.,
119 U.S.P.Q. 461 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), afjfd, 271 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1959); Cf.
Aerovox Corp. v. Polymet Mfg. Corp., 67 F.2d 860, 862 (2d Cir. 1933);
Browning Mfg. Co. v. Brothers, Inc., 134 U.S.P.Q. 231 (D. Minn. 1962),
aff'd, 317 F.2d 413 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 825 (1963); Sinclair
v. Backus, 4 F. 539 (D. Mass. 1880).
53. Smith & Griggs Mfg. Co. v. Sprague, 123 U.S. 249, 256 (1887).
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distribution outlets in representative geographical areas. The
selling price will probably be that at which it is expected the
invention will be sold if and when full production begins and
therefore includes profit. The invention may be advertised and
the test may continue for several months. The primary pur-
pose of a market test is to determine whether the public will
buy the invention in the market place although, at this stage, the
inventor is probably also concerned with promoting a market for
his invention by exposing it to the public. It is clear that a
market test, or a consumer test that approaches market test
proportions, 4 is "a trader's, and not an inventor's experiment"5 5
and, therefore, cannot be brought within the experimental use
exception.r6
(d) Public Demonstrations
A public demonstration, like a market test, may be an at-
tempt on the part of the inventor to promote a market for his
invention, in which case commercial exploitation is clearly pres-
ent and a finding of public use is justified. Although several
courts have so held,5 7 a recent decision has brought a public
demonstration within the experimental exception, apparently on
the sole ground that the invention was still in its experimental
stage at the time of the demonstration. 8 Although this result
54. See George R. Churchill Co. v. American Buff Co., 365 F.2d
129, 133-34 (7th Cir. 1966), where the inventor had distributed more
than 200 free samples of the invention to various jobbers and customers.
Although this distribution had characteristics both of a consumer and
market test, the fact that the samples were accompanied by claims of
product superiority and price quotations and that sales had apparently
resulted from the distribution would seem to provide sufficient justifi-
cation for the court's finding that the distribution was "commercially-
tinged" and therefore not an experimental use.
For another case finding a public use in "sampling" activity, see
Anderson Co. v. Trico Prods. Corp., 162 F. Supp. 224, 233-35 (W.D.N.Y.
1958), aff'd, 267 F.2d 700 (2d Cir.), rev'd on rehearing, 267 F.2d 702 (2d
Cir. 1959). But see Anderson Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 165 F. Supp.
611, 622 (N.D. Ill. 1958), a-f'd on other grounds, 265 F.2d 755 (7th Cir.
1959).
55. Smith & Davis Mg. Co. v. Mellon, 58 F. 705 (8th Cir. 1893).
56. See, e.g., Cataphote Corp. v. DeSoto Chem. Coatings, Inc., 235
F. Supp. 936 (N.D. Cal. 1964), aff'd, 356 F.2d 24 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 832 (1966); Tampax, Inc. v. Personal Prods. Corp., 38 F. Supp.
663, 672 (E.D.N.Y.), affd per curiam, 123 F.2d 722 (2d Cir. 1941).
57. See Koehring Co. v. National Automatic Tool Co., 362 F.2d 100
(7th Cir. 1966); Atlas v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 311 F.2d 156 (1st Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 904 (1963); Armour & Co. v. Rath Packing
Co., 154 F. Supp. 54 (N.D. Ill. 1957); In re Bertram, 88 F.2d 834, 837
(C.C.P.A. 1937).
58. See Sperry Rand Corp. v. Bell Tel. Laboratories, Inc., 208 F.
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is questionable on policy grounds,59 it would nevertheless seem
unwise to rule out the possibility of a noncommercial public
demonstration, which might arise if, for example, the inventor's
purpose in holding the demonstration was purely academic or
self-gratifying without any residual motive of commercial ex-
ploitation.
B. THE SUBTESTS IN APPLICATION
The proposed subtests have thus far been discussed individu-
ally. In the usual case, however, the subtests will have a
cumulative effect which should make the proper disposition of
the case clearer. For example, it has been suggested that a
public use may be found if the inventor either failed to inspect
or lost control over his invention. However, the fact that the
inventor did not inspect may buttress the conclusion that he lost
control over his invention6 and, conversely, the fact that the
inventor was not in control of his invention may buttress the
conclusion that he did not inspect. Furthermore, under the pro-
posed analysis, no single subtest in itself would be sufficient to
establish an experimental use, and therefore a court must view
the inventor's alleged experimentation as a whole in order to
find an experimental use. The two classic cases in the experi-
mental use area clearly demonstrate the cumulative effect of
the various subtests.
In Elizabeth v. Pavement Company,6' the patentee had in-
vented a new type of wooden pavement. In order to test the
pavement, he had laid a seventy-five foot strip on a public toll
road. The Supreme Court found that this use was experimental
and held the patent valid, even though the pavement had been
in general use on the toll road for six years prior to the in-
ventor's application for a patent. The Court noted that the in-
ventor had inspected the pavement almost every day during the
alleged experimental period and had received no direct com-
pensation for the use of the pavement. However, as has been
noted,62 there was no developmental work or changes made on
Supp. 598 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); cf. Browning 'Mrfg. Co. v. Brothers, Inc., 134
U.S.P.Q. 231 (D. Minn. 1962), affd, 317 F.2d 413 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 825 (1963).
59. See note 87 infra.
60. Cf. In re Blaisdell, 242 F.2d 779 (C.C.P.A. 1957).
61. 97 U.S. 126 (1877).
62. See Aerovox Corp. v. Polymet Mfg. Corp., 67 F.2d 860, 862 (2d
Cir. 1933). For a discussion of the Aerovox case, see text accompanying
notes 73 & 74 infra.
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the pavement during this period. The requirement of control
presents an interesting problem in Elizabeth because in a sense,
the inventor had transferred his invention to the public for test-
ing. Although the Court did not directly discuss this problem,
it seems clear that this transfer was justified by the fact that the
inventor probably lacked sufficient testing equipment himself.0 3
Moreover, the inventor clearly satisfied the proposed test of con-
trol in the case of a transfer by his retention of an interest in
the experimentation. 64 Thus, even in the absence of develop-
mental work, the inventor's inspections, retention of control, and
lack of commercial exploitation justify the Court's application of
the experimental exception.
In Egbert v. Lippman,65 the patentee had invented a new
type of corset spring. He had given the spring to his fianc~e
several years before he had applied for a patent. The Court
invalidated his patent on the grounds of public use, even though
the spring had been used in a very private manner. In finding
the public use, the Court emphasized the fact that the inventor
neither inspected nor made any attempt to change or improve
the spring during the years in which his fianc6e had it. Al-
though it was clear that the inventor had not commercially ex-
ploited his invention, the Court ruled that commercial exploita-
tion is not indispensable to a finding of public use. As in
Elizabeth, the Court did not directly consider the question of
control. It is not clear from the opinion whether the transfer of
the spring was necessary in order to test it. In any event, a
conclusion that control for purposes of experimentation was ab-
sent could be justified by the fact that the inventor had appar-
ently lost interest in the spring after its transfer to his fianc6e.
Of course, even if the inventor had retained control, the result
would not necessarily be changed since the presence of control
is not, in itself, sufficient to make out an experimental use.66
Elizabeth and Egbert demonstrate the interrelationship of
63. The Elizabeth Court did note that "the nature of a street pave-
ment is such that it cannot be experimented upon satisfactorily except
on a highway, which is always public." 97 U.S. at 134. See also Adams
v. Columbus Mfg. Co., 180 F. Supp. 921, 925-26 (M.D. Ga. 1960).
The inventor may have to justify the public nature of his experi-
mentation. See Smith & Davis Mfg. Co. v. Mellon, 58 F. 705, 706-07 (8th
Cir. 1893), where the court, in finding a public use, noted that the in-
ventor could have tested his invention privately, but did not.
64. See 97 U.S. at 133-34.
65. 104 U.S. 333 (1881).
66. See text accompanying notes 22-24 supra.
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the proposed subtests, 67 and both decisions may readily be justi-
fied in terms of those subtests. However, in view of the com-
pletely noncommercial use made of the invention in Egbert, it
is questionable whether the harsh result in that case was neces-
sitated by the policy of the public use statute. Unfortunately,
the doctrine that a public use may be found in the absence of
commercial exploitation is well-entrenched, and thus cannot be
removed by the use of subtests which purport to reflect the
law as it stands. A different approach is therefore necessary to
overcome the harsh result in Egbert.
IV. THE POLICY APPROACH-AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE
SUBTEST APPROACH
Although there has been confusion in the past, 8 today it is
generally agreed that the policy behind section 102(b) is to pre-
67. A recent case, Cataphote Corp. v. DeSoto Chem. Coatings, Inc.,
235 F. Supp. 936 (N.D. Cal. 1964), affd, 356 F.2d 24 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 832 (1966), provides a good model upon which the sub-
tests could be applied. There the patentee had invented a new type of
paint for highway markings. Samples of the paint had been sold to sev-
eral cities at a reduced price and in limited quantities more than a year
prior to the patentee's application for a patent. In finding a public use,
the court noted that the patentee had not diligently inspected the paint
after the various sales. His checking was characterized as that which
any hopeful seller would do in looking after his product. The court
also noted that research and developmental work had been discontinued
by the time of the sales. Although the court did not directly discuss the
question of control, it did note that the sales were without restriction
and that the patentee had not informed tae buyers that the sales were
for experimental purposes. These facts could be taken to indicate that
the patentee had lost contact with and interest in the alleged experi-
mentation, and would therefore support a finding that he had lost
control over the invention. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed,
characterizing the patentee's activity as "a program of market testing,
product introduction, and sales promotion."
68. At one time an inventor could commercially exploit the prod-
uct of a secret process or machine without losing his right to a patent
on the process or machine, as long as the process or machine could not
be understood by examination of the product. E.g., Peerless Roll Leaf
Co. v. H. Griffin & Sons Co., 29 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1928) (machine);
Stresau v. Ipsen, 77 F.2d 937 (C.C.P.A. 1S-35) (process). The rationale
was apparently that if the invention was not known to the public, it
could not be in public use. This rationale prejudiced the public interest
in that it permitted an inventor to extend the period of his commercial
monopoly by availing himself both of pre-patent commercial exploita-
tion and later-obtained patent protection. Today it is clear that if an
inventor commercially exploits the product of a secret process or ma-
chine, his right to a patent on the process or machine is terminated,
regardless of whether the process or machine could be known by the
product. United States Chem. Corp. v. Plastic Glass Corp., 243 F.2d 892
(3d Cir. 1957); Huszar v. Cincinnati Chem. Works, 172 F.2d 6 (6th Cir.
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vent an inventor from extending the period of his commercial
monopoly by commercially exploiting his invention before his
application for a patent.69 Evaluation of the uses of an inven-
tion in terms of this policy indicates that a use which commer-
cially exploits an invention contravenes this policy and should
therefore be found to constitute a public use,70 but that a use
which does not commercially exploit the invention does not
conflict with this policy and thus should not be found to consti-
tute a public use. Under this "policy approach," the determina-
tive question is simply whether the invention has been commer-
cially exploited more than one year prior to the application for
patent. The fact that the invention had passed its experi-
mental stage at the time of the use and the fact that the use
itself could not be characterized as experimental would be rele-
vant only to the extent that they imply commercial exploita-
tion.7 '
Courts have generally rejected the proposition that a public
use may be found only in the presence of commercial exploita-
tion.7 2  Nevertheless, a few decisions, although not expressly
recognizing this proposition, have included certain noncommer-
cial, nonexperimental uses within the experimental use excep-
tion. These decisions may therefore be used as a basis for the
adoption of the proposed policy approach.
In the well-reasoned case of Aerovox Corporation v. Polymet
Manufacturing Corporation," Judge Learned Hand assumed that
the invention in question had passed its experimental stage at
1949); Metallizing Eng'r Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153
F.2d 516 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 840 (1946); Solo Cup Co. v.
Paper Mach. Corp., 240 F. Supp. 126, 130 (E.D. Wis. 1965), modified on
other grounds, 359 F.2d 754 (7th Cir. 1966); cf. Allinson Mfg. Co. v.
Ideal Filter Co., 21 F.2d 22, 27-28 (8th Cir. 1927); Macbeth-Evans Glass
Co. v. General Elec. Co., 246 F. 695, 702 (6th Cir. 1917). But cf. Sof-
fron v. S.W. Lovell & Co., 246 F.2d 769 (1st Cir. 1957).
69. E.g., Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1 (1829); Koehring
Co. v. National Automatic Tool Co., 362 F.2d 100, 103 (7th Cir. 1966);
Metallizing Eng'r Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153 F.2d 516
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 840 (1946); Ushakoff v. United States,
327 F.2d 669, 672 (Ct. Cl. 1964); see generally Ellis, Subsequent Inven-
tor's Patent Rights With Regard to an Invention Previously Made by
Another Who Kept It Secret, 35 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 259, 278-79 (1953).
70. This proposition has been substantially accepted. See cases
cited note 69 supra.
71. The stage of the invention may be relevant since it is usually
doubtful that an inventor would commercially exploit an invention still
in its experimental stage. See In re Bertram, 88 F.2d 834, 837 (C.C.P.A.
1937).
72. See, e.g., Egbert v. Lippman, 104 U.S. 333 (1881).
73. 67 F.2d 860 (2d Cir. 1933).
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the time of its use. However, he refused to hold that this fact
was determinative of a public use 74 amd then distinguished per-
missible and nonpermissible post-experimental uses on the
grounds of commercial exploitation:
In Elizabeth v. Pavement Co., . . . it did not appear that ...
the inventor delayed for any other reason than to learn how
well his pavement would wear; apparently it was already as
good as he hoped to make it. At any rate we shall assume that
an inventor may wait longer, may wait until he learns whether
his invention is of enough value to justify an application for a
patent. On this view he may test it, not only to put it in defin-
itive form, but to see whether his ideas are worth exploiting.
But this added privilege has its limit. If in so doing he
does in fact exploit the completed invention commercially he
takes a chance that he may lose his patent.75
A similar approach was applied in the earlier case of Sin-
clair v. Backus.76 There the inventor had permitted a friend to
use his invention, an improved wrench, in order to induce him
to help in procuring a patent for the wrench. In finding an
experimental use, the court characterized permissible experi-
mental activity as follows:
The question to be determined is not only whether the tool will
work, but in what modes and with what advantages over old
tools; how well it will work and how cheaply; and I am of
opinion that he may, in such a case as this, test not only its
patentability, but the degree of it, if I may so say; that is,
whether it is worth while to patent it. . . .77
The SincZair and Aerovox cases include within the experi-
mental exception a use which may be roughly described as a
"value test," i.e., the invention has passed its experimental stage
and the use is made to determine whether the invention pos-
sesses sufficient potential commercial value to justify patent-
ing.7!8 It is doubtful whether such a use could be brought within
the experimental exception under the traditional law. 9 How-
74. Id. at 862.
75. Id.
76. 4 F. 539 (D. Mass. 1880).
77. Id. at 543.
78. See also Swain v. Holyoke Mach. Co., 109 F. 154, 158 (lst Cir.
1901) (dictum); Massie v. Fruit Growers' Express Co., 31 F.2d 463, 464-
65 (D. Del. 1929); United States Rifle Co. v. Whitney Arms Co., 28 F.
Cas. 819, 822 (No. 16,793) (C.C. Conn. 1877) (dictum), aff'd, 118 U.S. 22
(1886); cases cited note 52 supra.
79. For example, evaluation of the Sinclair case in terms of the
proposed subtests would require a finding of public use. The inventor
was not inspecting the wrench, but rather was ascertaining the reaction
of the borrower to the wrench. Although the Sinclair court refused to
draw a distinction on this point, most courts would hold this activity
to be a "trader's, and not an inventor's, experiment." See, e.g., Smith
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ever, when the policy approach is employed and the use evalu-
ated in terms of the policy underlying the statute, it becomes
clear that a value test does not offend this policy so long as it is
unblemished by commercial exploitation. Thus, the result in
Sinclair is justifiable since the inventor there did not commer-
cially exploit his invention. While Judge Hand found a public
use in Aerovox, this finding was based specifically on the pat-
entee's commercial exploitation 0 and is therefore not inconsist-
ent with the policy approach.
The Aerovox-Sinclair rationale has recently been extended
to a consumer test."' In International Silver Company v. Julie
Pomerantz, Inc.,8 2 the design patentee, through its advertising
agency, had conducted the consumer test on its new silverware
design. The agency had shown photographs of several differ-
ent silverware designs to about one hundred people, who were
asked to state which design they preferred. The photographs
remained in the possession of the interviewer and were returned
to patentee after the survey. On these facts, the lower court
found that the use was experimental.8 3 The Second Circuit af-
firmed, noting that the purpose of the test was to determine
consumer reaction to the new design.8 4
It is doubtful whether this consumer test could be brought
within the experimental use exception under traditional law.8 5
& Davis Mg. Co. v. Mellon, 58 F. 705, 707 (8th Cir. 1893). Although it
is not clear from the opinion whether the inventor retained control over
the wrench, it is clear that he had ceased developmental work on the
wrench at the time of the use.
80. See Aerovox Corp. v. Polymet Mfg. Corp., 67 F.2d 860, 862 (2d
Cir. 1933).
81. For a discussion of consumer tests, see text accompanying notes
52 & 53 supra.
82. 119 U.S.P.Q. 461 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), aff'd, 271 F.2d 69 (2d Cir.
1959). See also Johnson & Johnson v. Kendall Co., 215 F. Supp. 124
(N.D. Ill. 1963), rev'd on other grounds, 327 F.2d 391 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 934 (1964) (similar consumer test held an experimental
use).
83. 119 U.S.P.Q. at 461.
84. International Silver Co. v. Pomerantz, 271 F.2d 69, 72 (2d Cir.
1959). The court of appeals apparently did not apply the experimental
use exception but rather affirmed on the grounds that the photographs
did not constitute a "use" of the design. This approach is questionable
in that the photographs were certainly sufficient to expose the inven-
tive concept to the public.
85. This is indicated by the proposed subtests. The inspection in
International Silver did not relate to the invention itself, but rather to
the consumer's reaction to the invention. See note 79 supra. Although
both the district court and the Second Circuit emphasized the fact that
the inventor's agents retained control over the invention during the test,
1968]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
However, when the policy approach is used and the test evalu-
ated in terms of the policy of the statute, it is reasonable to
conclude that the test was not tainted with commercial exploita-
tion, and the result in International Silver is therefore justifi-
able.
The Aerovox, Sinclair and International Silver cases would
probably not support the broad proposition that any noncommer-
cial use may be brought within the experimental exception.
When the three cases are read together, however, they do sup-
port the more narrow proposition that any noncommercial use
for the purpose of determining whether the invention possesses
sufficient potential commercial value to justify patenting may
be brought within the experimental use exception, whether or
not that particular use may in itself be characterized as experi-
mental. As such, these cases clearly represent an inroad on the
doctrine that a noncommercial use may be a public use, and thus
provide a starting point for the adoption of the proposed policy
approach. While the above cases did not completely adopt the
policy approach, there exist several reasons why it should be
adopted in toto.
The most important reason for the adoption of the proposed
policy approach is that it would provide a more accurate and
realistic basis of decision in light of the policy of the statute."0
In some cases courts using the "stage of the invention" criterion
have not accorded full effect to this policy. Such a situation is
presented when the inventor commercially exploits his invention
before it has passed its experimental stage. Since, under the
"stage of the invention" criterion, no use of the invention be-
fore it passes its experimental stage will be a public use, this
commercial exploitation is permitted 7 to the detriment of the
it has been seen that the retention of control is not in itself sufficient
to make out an experimental use. See text accompanying notes 22-24
supra. Also, the inventor had apparently ceased developmental work
on the invention at the time of the consumer test.
86. See note 69 supra and accompanying text.
87. In Sperry Rand Corp. v. Bell Tel. Laboratories, Inc., 208 F.
Supp. 598 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), the invention, a new type of computer, was
extensively demonstrated to various groups, including the press. The
court applied the experimental use exception to these public demonstra-
tions, apparently on the sole ground that the computer had not passed
its experimental stage at the time of the demonstrations.
In Browning Mfg. Co. v. Brothers, Inc., 134 U.S.P.Q. 231 (D. Minn.
1962), affd, 317 F.2d 413 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 825 (1963),
the invention, a soil compactor machine, was displayed at a "Road
Show" to potential customers of the inventor. The court found that
this display did not constitute a public use, although it is not clear
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public. The policy approach would avoid this problem because
commercial exploitation would always be sufficient to invoke the
statute, and the fact that the exploitation occurred before the
invention passed its experimental stage would be irrelevant.
Thus, in this situation, adoption of the policy approach would
contract the scope of the experimental use exception.
Another reason for the adoption of the policy approach is
that several particular noncommercial, nonexperimental uses
may be beneficial both to the inventor and the public and there-
fore should be made permissible. For example, allowing the in-
ventor to determine whether his invention is worth patenting
by means of a consumer or value test may save both the in-
ventor and the Patent Office a good deal of time and money. A
public demonstration may, in line with the constitutional basis
for the patent system, "promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts"88 by facilitating the exchange of technical informa-
tion. 9
Although the above factors operate in the interest of the
public, it could be argued that adoption of the policy approach
would prejudice the public because it would permit an inventor
to delay his application for a patent, and thus increase the time
interval before the public receives the benefits of the inven-
tionY0 Such would be the situation if the inventor made a non-
whether this finding was based on the grounds that the invention had
not passed its experimental stage at the time of the display, or rather
on the grounds that the machine was not actually "used" at the Show.
In any event, a price for the invention was quoted at the Show. The
court held that this price quotation did not place the invention "on sale"
within the statute, and this holding was based on the grounds that the
invention had not passed its experimental stage at the time of its dis-
play. In both the Sperry Rand case and the Browning case it is prob-
able that the inventors were attempting to develop a market for their
inventions by exposing them to the public, and therefore a finding of
commercial exploitation is indicated. See cases cited note 57 supra.
88. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
89. Cf. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMIvuSSION ON THE PATENT SYS-
TEM (1966), Recommendation III (1), where temporary protection for
a display in "an official or officially recognized international exhibition"
is recommended if necessary to comply with the requirements of the
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, June 2, 1934,
art. 11, 53 Stat. 1748 (1939), T.S. No. 941.
90. Although some commentators have suggested that the policy of
§ 102 (b) is to encourage prompt disclosure, e.g., A. SMITH, PATENT LAW
312 (2d ed. 1964); Note, Public Use: The Inventor's Dilemma, 26 GEO.
WASH. L. Rnv. 297, 305 (1958), it is suggested that the reason for such
encouragement is to prevent inventors from extending the period of
their commercial monopoly by both pre-patent commercial exploitation
and patent protection. See cases cited note 69 supra.
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experimental, noncommercial use of his invention in public. Un-
der the proposed policy approach, such a use would not come
within the statute and thus the inventor would not be required
to file his application within one year.91 However, it would seem
that such a situation would occur rarely since the inventor,
lured by the prospect of financial reward, will generally attempt
to patent as soon as his invention is ready. Moreover, if the
inventor does in fact delay for too long, he may be precluded
from obtaining a patent under the abandonment statute 2 or by
the doctrine of constructive abandonment.9 3 If it is considered
necessary to further preclude the possibility of undue delay,
resort might be had to legislation94 or, in the alternative, to a
broadening of the doctrine of constructive abandonment.
It should be cautioned that commercial exploitation may be
a difficult criterion to apply because it may take many different
forms, such as sales, public demonstrations, consumer tests, or
market tests. In determining whether commercial exploitation
was present in the inventor's use of his invention, it would be
relevant to inquire into, for example, the inventor's purpose in
the use,95 the people exposed to the use,96 the stage of the in-
91. The public could, of course, make free use of the invention
until the inventor did patent.
92. 35 U.S.C. § 102(c) (1964).
93. See, e.g., Uihlein v. General Elec. Co., 47 F.2d 997, 1000 (7th
Cir. 1931); see generally 2 A. H. WALKER, PATENTS § 133 (A. Deller ed.
1964); Ellis, Subsequent Inventor's Patent Rights with Regard to an
Invention Previously Made by Another Who Kept It Secret, 35 J. PAT.
OFF. Soc'Y 259 (1953).
94. Cf. Note, Prior Art in the Patent Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 369, 384
(1959).
95. Of course, the inventor's subjective intent is not controlling,
Swain v. Holyoke Mach. Co., 109 F. 154, 160 (1st Cir. 1901), and some-
times has been given little or no weight. See Renette Co. v. Ford Motor
Co., 47 U.S.P.Q. 245, 246 (N.D. Ill. 1940). Still, ascertaining the inven-
tor's intent may help to elucidate the true nature of the use. Well
Surveys, Inc. v. McCullough Tool Co., 199 F. Supp. 374, 396 (N.D. Okla.
1961), af'd, 343 F.2d 381 (10th Cir. 1965). Objective evidence of the
inventor's intent may occasionally be found in invention records, see
Well Surveys, Inc. v. McCullough Tool Co., 343 F.2d 381, 394 (10th Cir.
1965), or in other documents, see Elizabeth v. Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126,
129, 133 (1877); Ushakoff v. United States, 327 F.2d 669, 677 (Ct. Cl.
1964).
96. Quantitatively, the number of people exposed to the use may
be relevant in determining whether the use was a consumer or market
test, possibly using the number of people needed to carry out a con-
sumer test in the circumstances as a reference standard. Qualitatively,
it would clearly be relevant to inquire whether the people exposed to
a public demonstration or "consumer test" were randomly selected or
were rather potential customers of the inventor. Compare International
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vention at the time of the use,97 and any affirmative justifica-
tions the inventor may have for his use.9 8
V. CONCLUSION
The use of subtests relating to the inventor's activities dur-
ing his alleged experimentation has been proposed to aid courts
in their resolution of complex experimental use questions. These
subtests would merely reflect present law.
However, because present law is sometimes unjustifiably
harsh, an alternative approach which would focus on the na-
ture of the use has also been suggested. Under this "policy
approach," the use which the inventor made of the invention
would be evaluated in terms of the policy of the statute and,
therefore, the presence or absence of commercial exploitation
would be determinative. While the adoption of the policy ap-
proach would require the overruling of the doctrine that a
public use may be found in the absence of commercial exploita-
tion, its adoption should be seriously considered if it is desirable
to bring experimental use decisions into closer accord with the
policy of the public use statute.
An intermediate position is to employ the traditional law
in making the original determination of whether the experimen-
tal use exception is applicable. The proposed subtests could, of
course, be used in this determination. If, however, the inventor
made some use of his invention which, under traditional law,
would preclude the application of the exception, the policy ap-
proach could then be applied in order to allow the inventor to
show affirmative justifications for such use. For example, the
inventor might be permitted to prove that his use was noncom-
mercial and motivated by a permissible purpose, such as an
attempt to determine whether the invention possessed sufficient
potential commercial value to justify patenting. Such an ap-
proach, although not requiring an immediate major break with
precedent, would allow for the gradual expansion of the exper-
imental use exception by the inclusion, on a case-by-case basis,
of certain desirable post-experimental uses.
Silver Co. v. Julie Pomerantz, Inc., 119 U.S.P.Q. 461 (S.D.N.Y. 1958),
aff'd, 271 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1959), with George R. Churchill Co. v. Amer-
ican Buff Co., 365 F.2d 129 (7th Cir. 1966). But cf. Sperry Rand Corp.
v. Bell Tel. Laboratories, Inc., 208 F. Supp. 598 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Brown-
ing Mfg. Co. v. Brothers, Inc., 134 U.S.P.Q. 231 (D. Minn. 1962), affd,
317 F.2d 413 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 825 (1963). For comments
on the latter two cases, see note 87 supra.
97. See note 71 supra.
98. See text accompanying notes 88 & 89 supra.
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